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The success of the U. S. military recruiting depends not only on recruiting efforts 
but also on the labor market conditions. In this thesis, the econometric literature of 
military recruiting analysis based on historical data from FY81 to FY89 is reviewed. The 
random effects meta analysis models are used to examine the systematic variation in high 
quality enlistment elasticities obtained over different studies with respect to advertising, 
recruiter forces, and unemployment rate, respectively. 
The results of the meta analysis show that (1) the Army advertising turns out 
to be more effective than that of the other military services; (2) the models with the 
recruiting goal factor tend to have significantly smaller recruiting elasticities with respect 
to advertising and recruiter forces than their counterpart; (3) the unemployment rate 
elasticities do not vary significantly over different studies; (4) the Army advertising 
elasticity on the high quality contract is relatively low compared to the unemployment 
rate and the recruiter elasticities; (5) in terms of cost, the military expenditure for the 
recruiters appears to be more cost-effective in producing quality recruits than advertising 
expenditure, when the cumulative long-run effects for advertising were ignored. These 
findings are expected to give some insights into future military recruiting. 
VI 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION     1 
A. BACKGROUND  1 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT     3 
C. OVERVIEW OF THESIS      3 
1. Objective   3 
2. Organization    4 
II. MILITARY RECRUITING    5 
A. OVERVIEW   5 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF HIGH QUALITY ENLISTMENTS    6 
C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING HIGH QUALITY ENLISTMENTS   — 11 
1. Advertising      11 
2. Recruiters        12 
3. Unemployment Rate and Relative Military Pay     13 
4. Goal     15 
III. REVIEW OF RECRUITING ANALYSIS  17 
A. ECONOMETRIC MODELS  17 
B. OBSERVATION  27 
IV. META ANALYSIS  31 
A. GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL      32 
1. Effect-size estimate     32 
2. Level-1 (within-study) model        33 
3. Level-2 (between-studies) model  33 
4. Combined model    34 
5. Estimation        34 
B. RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL    35 
1. HML estimation    35 
2. Random effects meta analysis model  36 
V. DATA ANALYSIS     41 
A. ACQUISITION OF DATA     41 
B. FACTORS AND CASES IN RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL     43 
C. ESTIMATED MODELS  46 
D. DISCUSSION       49 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  55 
A. SUMMARY OF RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS     55 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  56 
vu 
APPENDIX A. GAMS PROGRAM  59 
APPENDIX B. S AS PROGRAM      61 
LIST OF REFERENCES  63 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST       67 
vm 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.     AFQT CATEGORIES AND CORRESPONDING 
PERCENTILE SCORE RANGES  8 
PERCENT OF HIGH QUALITY RECRUITS  10 
CIVILIAN PAY VS RELATIVE MILITARY PAY RATE 
FOR THE ARMY  14 
DESCRIPTION OF EACH STUDY USED IN META ANALYSIS — 41 
FACTORS AND ELASTICITIES  42 
FACTORS IN THE RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS  43 
MEAN ELASTICITIES OF RECRUTING COMPONENTS  44 
WLS ESTIMATE ft AND SE(Y£)   47 
OLS ESTIMATE  fk AND SE(fk)   47 
HML ESTIMATE y" AND SE ( y")   48 
COMPARISON OF SIGNIFICANT FACTORS 
AMONG DIFFERENT METHODS    49 
Table 12.   HISTORICAL DATA FOR THE ARMY RECRUITING 













LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.    AFQT Score vs Military Job Experience  8 
Figure 2.    Advertising Expenditures  11 
Figure 3.   Number of Recruiters vs Number of High Quality 
Enlistments (x 0.1)      13 
Figure 4.   Unemployment Rate vs High Quality Rate  14 
Figure 5.   High Quality Contract Goals  15 
Figure 6.   Estimated Advertising Elasticity (B) and SE (B)  44 
Figure 7.   Estimated Recruiter Elasticity (B) and SE (B)  45 
Figure 8.   Estimated Unemployment Rate Elasticity (B) and SE (B)  45 
Figure 9.   95% Confidence Interval for Advertising Elasticity  50 
Figure 10. 95% Confidence Interval for Recruiter Elasticity  50 




As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has begun a large scale 
drawdown of the size of its military forces. This downsizing translates into fewer recruits 
to be enlisted into the military. A smaller number of recruits may appear to require a reduced 
recruiting effort. However, in fact, having to recruit fewer people means that the U.S. 
Military services must be selective about who can enlist into the services. 
In order to support each service's recruiting mission, a considerable amount of funds 
has been allocated to military recruiting. During FY93, the services spent approximately $1.5 
billion to recruit personnel. In an era of decreasing budgets, the services must ensure that 
they reap the full benefit of their spending. Efficient allocation of the recruiting efforts has 
been one of the major concerns of each military service's recruiting command. In addition, 
recruiting is sensitive to fluctuations in labor market conditions such as recruiting goal, 
unemployment rate, relative military pay to civilian wage, prime target market population, 
and the services' competition. 
There have been numerous studies that analyzed the effects of both military recruiting 
efforts and the labor market conditions on high quality enlistments. Most studies employ 
econometric models and the study results are summarized in terms of the elasticities of the 
high quality contracts with respect to advertising, the number of recruiters, and the 
unemployment rate. Elasticities are defined that how the high quality enlistment responds 
to a 1 percent change in advertising, the number of recruiters, and the unemployment rate. 
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However, many differences have been observed among the study results. In this thesis, the 
military recruiting literature is reviewed and random effects meta analysis models are used 
to analyze the systematic variation in the published elasticities of high quality contracts with 
respect to advertising, the number of recruiters, and the unemployment rate. Although 
advertising, the number of recruiters, and the unemployment rate were treated relatively 
homogeneously, compared to the other variables such as incentives and pay, high quality 
elasticities estimated with respect to these components vary over different study 
results. 
In a random effects model, the elasticity involved in each study is considered as an 
outcome of a random sample from a population. Various recruiting studies are viewed as 
imperfect replications of one overall unplanned experiment. Each elasticity is assumed to 
be random and a linear model for the elasticity is fitted against some factors such as service, 
goal, and competition to identify sources of the systematic variation. Sixteen study results 
are selected for the random effects meta analysis. The study results used in the random 
effects model have some common features as well as differences. The common features are, 
first, the relatively homogeneous measurement of advertising, recruiter effort, and 
unemployment rate; secondly the time period (1989-1991) based on which the high quality 
contract elasticity of each component is estimated; thirdly, the availability of standard error 
of the estimated elasticity. However, these 16 studies differ in terms of targeting military 
service(Army and other services), inclusion of other service's competition, and inclusion of 
recruiting goal in the model.  In view of these different features,  three factors (Service, 
xiv 
Competition, and Goal) were chosen. Ten out of sixteen studies are for the Army recruiting 
analysis, fourteen studies use a goal factor in their analyses, and eight studies include 
competition factor in their analyses. The maximum likelihood (ML) method is used to 
estimate the effects of these factors on each elasticity. 
The significant findings are outlined as follows: 
Significant service and goal effects are found in advertising; Army advertising turns 
out to be more effective than that of the other military services while the models with the 
recruiting goal component tend to have significantly smaller recruiting elasticity. Goal turns 
out to be significantly dependent on the variation in the recruiter elasticity. None of the 
three factors turns out to be significantly dependent on the variation in the unemployment 
rate elasticity. 
When both competition and goal factors are included in the Army recruiting analysis, 
the 95% confidence intervals centered at the mean for the high quality enlistment elasticities 
with respect to advertising, recruiter, and unemployment rate are (-0.02, 0.15,0.32), (-0.04, 
0.43, 0.89), and (0.32, 0.50, 0.68). These intervals can be interpreted as follows. As 
advertising expenditure increases by 1%, it is expected that high quality enlistments would 
increase by 0.15% on average and by a maximum of 0.32% with 95% confidence. 
Likewise, as the number of recruiters increases by 1%, it is estimated that high quality 
enlistments would increase by 0.43% on average and by a maximum of 0.89% with 95% 
confidence. That is, in order to increase the high quality enlistments by 1% (about 492 
personnel), at least an additional  2.85 million dollars (FY95 constant) should be spent for 
xv 
the Army advertising, and an additional minimum amount of 1.87 million dollars (FY95 
constant) in the recruiter expenditure would be needed. With respect to unemployment rate, 
as unemployment rate rises by 1%, it is expected that high quality enlistments would 
increase by 0.50% on average and by a maximum of 0.68% with 95% confidence. 
The recommendations for future recruiting analysis are briefly outlined below. 
The three factors and the case studies used in this thesis may not be exhaustive. 
One of the additional factors to be further considered in the meta analysis for the military 
recruiting models is different estimation methods,   provided   that there are sufficient 
replicated studies in which the same estimation method is used. 
In the analysis of random effects meta analysis models, it was assumed that the 
results of each published study are independent of each other. However, it is possible that 
some study results might be related due to the estimation of slightly different models on the 
same data set. Although neglecting the potential dependence in the random effects meta 
analysis models does not appear to have a significant impact on the inference procedure, 
a sensitivity analysis based on Monte Carlo simulation is recommended for further study. 
In analyzing a set of three elasticities (advertising, recruiter, and unemployment rate), 
a multivariate analysis could be applied. However, in general, the covariance matrices for 
these estimated elasticities are not reported in the literature and subsequent analysis is 
infeasible. All studies reviewed in this thesis assume constant elasticity, which does not 
necessarily reflect the dynamic feature of military recruiting. It is recommended that 
authors  report the covariance matrix of the estimated elasticities  and a time varying 
xvi 
coefficient method be used to estimate elasticities for future research in the area of high 
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With the advent of the all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973, the United States ended its 
heavy reliance on the draft to provide first-term enlisted personnel and turned to economic 
incentives to attract the approximately 300,000 new recruits it requires each year. Much 
initial skepticism existed over the viability of the AVF, but recruiting during the early period 
was surprisingly successful [Ref.32: p.47]. During the 1970s, the Military was generally 
able to obtain the number of individuals required, but the quality of those recruits, as 
measured by high school completion and aptitude scores, has varied considerably. In 1979, 
for example, only 16% of the individuals enlisting in the Army had high school diplomas 
[Ref.6: p.261]. The Army's experience was particularly dismal, and the poor quality of 
accessions threatened the AVF. 
However, the quality of recruits increased substantially throughout the 1980s. The 
significant rise in high quality enlistments in the Military during the 1980s was partly 
attributed to economic conditions that were highly favorable to recruiting, as well as the 
large increases in relative pay and high civilian unemployment rate during that period. 
Particularly, the Army experienced the greatest improvement in high quality enlistments 
during the early 1980s, in part because of the Army College Fund (ACF). In addition, the 
introduction of the New GI Bill program (NGIB) in 1986 made all four services' recruiting 
successful. The NGIB program, which has undergone several phases, has permitted the 
Military to supplement the educational benefits to high quality recruits in hard-to-fill skills 
[Ref.33]. An important development during the 1980s was a renewed emphasis on 
educational benefits to attract high quality enlistments. However, continued growth in the 
economy, a declining youth population, and budgetary pressures contributed to difficulties 
for military recruiting during the late 1980s. 
U.S. Military services have experienced a period of enormous turbulence and 
uncertainty since 1990. The major impact of the end of the Cold War, coupled with the 
sound defeat of Iraq by coalition forces in 1991 resulted in the required reduction of 
military strength. This reduction can be achieved by either taking an accession-heavy- 
approach or an across-the-board approach [Ref. 14]. In the accession-heavy-approach, 
major reduction is achieved at the entry level of accession, and it results in a top-heavy force 
that can be inefficient and costly. Therefore, the across-the-board approach that takes 
reduction from different ranks is, in general, preferred. The increased accession goal for 
the Army active duty force in 1993 is a good example of the preference of the across-the- 
board to accession-heavy-approach. Public perception of smaller armed forces, however, 
makes recruiting more difficult. The analysis of the military recruiting process and the 
effects of the recruiting effort should help to plan effective recruiting under such adverse 
circumstances. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There have been numerous studies that analyzed the effects of both recruiting efforts 
(advertising, number of recruiters, recruiting goal, and so on) and the labor market conditions 
on enlistments (Goldberg [Ref. 10]; Hanssens and Levien [Ref. 13]; Daula and Smith [Ref.6]; 
Polich, Dertouzos and Press [Ref. 23]; Kostiuk and Follmann [Ref. 16]; Dertouzos [Ref. 7]; 
Dertouzos and Polich [Ref.8]; Goldberg [Ref.l 1]; Warner [Ref.33]; Kearl, Home and Gilroy 
[Ref. 15]; Goldberg [Ref. 12]; Lovell and Morey [Ref. 17]; Lovell, Morey and Wood [Ref. 18]; 
Morey [Ref. 19]; Charnes et al. [Ref.5]; Berner and Daula [Ref.2]). Most studies employ 
econometric models, while some adopt data envelopment analysis. In general, study results 
are summarized in terms of the elasticities of the high quality contracts with respect to 
recruiting efforts and labor market conditions. Elasticities are defined as percentage changes 
in the high quality enlistment in response to a percentage change in recruiting efforts or 
labor market conditions. But, there are many differences among the study results. These 
differences can cause confusion to recruiting practitioners. 
C. OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
1. Objective 
The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the systematic variation in the published 
elasticities of recruiting efforts using a random effects meta analysis model [Ref.9&28]. The 
findings are expected to give some insights into future military recruiting. 
2. Organization 
Chapter II describes the background of military recruiting. Chapter III reviews the 
previous study results concerning high quality recruiting analyses. Chapter IV introduces 
a meta analysis that provides a tool to combine different study results. Based on the meta 
analysis method, average elasticities of high quality contracts are calculated with respect to 
some recruiting efforts and market conditions. In Chapter V, the actual data analysis is 
performed to examine the variation over the study results. Finally, in Chapter VI, the results 
are discussed and some recommendations are made for further research. 
II. MILITARY RECRUITING 
A. OVERVIEW 
Since the advent of the AVF in July 1973, the U.S. military services have employed 
several marketing strategies to meet various quantity and quality goals. As opposed to the 
conventional markets, the product to be sold is the entry level positions for each military 
occupational skill (MOS), and the main focus of the marketing strategy lies in filling the 
quotas for these positions with high quality applicants. 
Military recruiting is processed at several different hierarchies. For example, the 
U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) had 4 recruiting brigades, with control over 40 
recruiting battalions, with an average 90 recruiters assigned to each battalion in FY94. Its 
primary mission is to recruit men and women to fill the enlisted ranks of both active duty and 
U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units. Each recruiting battalion consists of 3 to 7 recruiting 
companies that supervise the recruiting activities of 6 to 10 recruiting stations. The 
recruiting stations (1390 stations in FY94) are supervised by a senior noncommissioned 
officer who, together with one or more recruiters, conduct the actual recruiting activities. 
Despite the increasing role of women in the military, actual recruiting activity for active duty 
primarily targets males from 17 to 21 years of age with no prior military service. 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF HIGH QUALITY ENLISTMENTS 
As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has begun a large scale 
drawdown of the size of its Military forces. For instance, the Army will reduce the active 
component from 12 to 10 divisions, and the Army's active end strength from 540,000 to 
495,000 by the end of fiscal 1996. In 1989, the Army had 18 active divisions with an active 
end strength of 770,000. When this reconstitution is completed, the Army will have been 
reduced by 36% from its 1989 structure [Ref.29]. Further downsizing of active Army 
Forces could be met partly through reducing the number of young men and women 
accessed into the forces. This downsizing translates into fewer numbers of recruits to be 
enlisted into the military annually. A smaller number of recruits may appear to require a 
reduced recruiting effort. However, in fact having to recruit fewer people means that the 
U.S. military services must be more selective about who can enlist into the services. 
Moreover, the ever-increasing sophistication of weapons and support systems, together with 
intelligent employment of these systems, means that only the best and brightest be allowed 
to enter the force. 
"The quality of military personnel is at an all-time high. All commanders attribute 
the success of DESERT STORM to quality of the people and their training ." ' 
^ohn, Christopher, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force 
Management and Personnel, in : Memorandum for the Secretary of 
Defense, OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, LESSONS LEARNED, 
unpublished, not numbered, 1991. 
This statement suggests that further success for the U.S.Armed Forces will depend 
on effective recruitment policies and training methods. 
Recruits must meet a variety of physical, mental, and moral qualifications. The 
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) is the examination given to all 
prospective members of the armed forces. The ASVAB is a series of ten tests2, each 
yielding a separate score. One combination of scores on the ASVAB serves as the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The AFQT serves as a screening test. It eliminates those 
who are not qualified to serve. The AFQT score is derived from a composite of a candidate's 
scores on the Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, and 
Numerical Operations section of ASVAB. Table 1 provides a break-down of AFQT 
Categories with corresponding percentile score ranges. A high quality enlistment is defined 
as a recruit who has a valid high school diploma, or is a senior in the process of obtaining 
one, and who scores in categories I through IILA on the AFQT. Figure 1 shows the strong 
relationship between aptitude measure (AFQT) and military hands-on performance test 
scores for all 30 specialities on which data were collected. To the extent that AFQT is a 
valid predictor of performance, people with higher AFQT scores should outperform their 
counterparts with lower AFQT scores at each military job experience level [Ref.21]. 
^General  Science,  Arithmetic Reasoning,  Word Knowledge, 
Paragraph Comprehension, Numerical Operations, Coding Speed, Auto 
&   Shop   Information,   Mathematics   Knowledge, Mechanical 
Comprehension, and Electronics Information. 
Table 1. AFQT CATEGORIES AND CORRESPONDING PERCENTILE 
SCORE RANGES 
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Figure 1. AFQT Test Scores vs Job Experience 
Prime target market recruits are considered to be 17 to 21 year old male, high school 
diploma graduates. In general, the prime target market population can be either at school 
or at work. Many of them might be interested in finding a job, or consider changing to a new 
job. In view of several education programs and incentive polices that the military offers for 
those who are looking for a job, a military position in the services can be an attractive 
alternative to a civilian job. From a labor economic perspective, an individual enlists when 
the military compensation package meets or exceeds his current wage. In addition to the 
civilian job competition, there is inter-service competition among different military services 
in terms of attracting the prime target market population. 
The quality of recruits increased substantially throughout the 1980s (see Table 2) as 
reflected by an increase in the proportion of high school graduates and by rising scores on 
the AFQT. This contrasts sharply with the late 1970s recruit population that consisted of 
54% high school graduates with only 25% scoring above the 50th percentile on the AFQT, 
for the Army. Recently (FY93 and FY94), recruiting efforts were less successful than the 
1980s, due partly to the diminishing male youth population and growing economy. 
Sustained economic growth resulted in low unemployment rates and higher real earnings for 
youth, therefore more youths have recently had better job opportunities than were 
available during the early 1980s. Another reason for successful recruiting is the substantial 
cut in the Military recruiting budget. For the Army, for instance, between 1986 and 1990, 
funding for recruiting (measured in 1989 dollars) declined by 22%. This significantly 
reduced funds allocated for important recruiting initiatives such as Army educational benefits 
9 
Table 2. PERCENT OF HIGH QUALITY RECRUITS 
Service '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 
Navy 41 45 54 54 51 48 52 52 48 55 62 66 64 63 
Marine Corps 39 43 48 49 53 65 66 61 63 62 67 70 66 68 
Army 29 39 45 47 52 54 58 52 55 62 78 78 66 66 
Air Force 51 56 66 70 69 71 76 82 82 85 85 85 79 80 
DoD Total 39 45 52 53 56 57 60 61 58 64 72 74 67 68 
(Source: Navy Times/March 6,1995) 
and advertising. Moreover, the cut restricted availability of a particularly popular enlistment 
incentive - the two-year enlistment tour. 
In an era of decreasing budgets, the services must ensure that they reap the full 
benefit of their spending.  Efficient allocation of the recruiting effort has been one of the 
major concerns of each military service's recruiting command. Individual components of 
the recruiting budget known to have a significant impact on enlistment include advertising, 
recruiter efforts, and special targeted incentives. In addition, recruiting is sensitive to 
fluctuations in labor market conditions such as recruiting goals, unemployment rate, 
relative military pay to civilian wage, size of the prime target market population, and 
competition from other services. In the following section, each component of recruiting 
efforts and labor market conditions is reviewed briefly. 
10 
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Figure 2. Advertising Expenditures (millions of 1982 dollars) 
1.   Advertising 
Advertising is one of the primary tools used by the U.S. Military to achieve its 
enlistment goals. Most recruiting advertising is done through national, or centralized media 
purchases: network television, network radio, national magazines, and direct mail. The 
services typically use these media to disseminate messages intended to enhance their 
images and to describe the general character of the jobs and training they offer. In addition, 
each service carries out a local advertising program (daily, weekly, high school newspapers 
11 
and locally purchased spot radio advertising), through which local districts promote more 
immediate themes -such as current job opportunities, enlistment options, and the names 
and telephone numbers of recruiters who can be connected by prospective recruits. Local 
advertising is also cited as a means of supplementing the national campaigns. Local 
advertising, in all, accounts for about 10 to 15 percent of the total advertising budget. Figure 
2 shows advertising expenditures for FY1981-1988, in 1982 real dollars. Army advertising 
expenditures comprised a high and rising share of advertising . Although Army advertising 
expenditures declined nearly 10 percent during the 1987-1988 period, they rose by 50% 
between 1981 and 1986 [Ref.33: p.49-51]. 
2. Recruiters 
One can expect the number of recruiters to have a large and significant effect on the 
number of enlistments since recruiters have direct and continual contact with prospective 
applicants. Figure 3 shows that the number of active recruiters increased gradually over the 
decade (FY80 - FY89) from approximately 4,800 to nearly 5,800 in the Army [Ref. 12]. 
Recruiters contact many potential enlistees and stimulate interest in military services. The 
performance of recruiters contribute to the high quality enlistments. The recruiter force is 
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Figure 3. Number of Recruiters vs Number of High Quality Enlistment^0.1) 
3. Unemployment Rate and Relative Military Pay 
The supply of high quality enlistments has been sensitive to fluctuations in the youth 
labor market. The analysis of labor market conditions must begin with the two basic 
economic forces that determine military enlistments: (1) military pay relative to civilian 
wages and (2) the civilian unemployment rate. 
From Figure 4, one may trace the decline in high quality recruiting of the late 1980s 
in the Army, for instance, largely due to declining male (16-21years) civilian unemployment 
rate [Ref. 12].    Between 1981 and 1983, an increasing civilian unemployment rate also 
13 
contributed to a military favorable recmiting environment. During this period, the dearth 
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Figure 4. Unemployment Rate vs High Quality Rate 
Table 3. CIVILIAN PAY(CP) VS RELATIVE MILITARY PAY RATE(RMPR) FOR THE 
ARMY 
'81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 
CP($) 29468 30607 31408 32701 33669 34346 35010 35804 36590 
RMPR 1.057 1.158 1.166 1.141 1.141 1.169 1.167 1.165 1.189 
Relative military pay rate(RMPR) is the ratio of the present value of Regular Military 
Compensation (RMC) for a typical enlistee over a four-year period to the present value of 
full-time equivalent earnings of 18-21 year-old civilian males.  Data on military pay and 
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promotion rate were obtained from the Department of Defense (Office of Military 
Compensation) [Ref. 12]. Since FY1982, military pay has maintained a rough parity with 
civilian wages(see Table 3). 
4. Goal 
Enlistment goals are a primary factor shaping the actual number of enlistments into 
the armed forces. Such goals, which reflect the services' demand for new entrants, are 
driven largely by force level authorizations and personnel turn-over. Because goals are a 
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Figure 5. High Quality Contract Goals 
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by how well the services accomplish their goals than by absolute numbers of enlistments. 
In general, recruiters are given monthly quotas or goals by their Recruiting Commands. 
Figure 5 displays the services' total contract enlistment goals for FY1981 - 1988 [Ref. 12: 
p.49-50]. They move quite differently over the period. The Army, after dropping its goal 
in 1982, expanded its goal considerably during 1983-1985, and then reduced it during 1986- 
1988. In particular, the Army has provided detailed goals, the so-called Mission Box, to 
recruiters by enlistment category since FY1986 [Ref.33]. This had a strong positive effect 
on high quality enlistments. 
There are many studies that analyzed these factors (i.e., advertising, recruiters, 
unemployment rate, goal, etc) in relation to the fluctuation in high quality enlistments. In 
the following Chapter, results of these studies are summarized. 
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III. REVIEW OF RECRUITING ANALYSIS 
A. ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
Daula and Smith [Ref.6] estimated several high quality enlistment models using a 
time series and cross sectional data set of monthly observations on Army's 54 recruiting 
battalions data from October 1980 through June 1983. Their models were different from 
previous studies of Army enlistments in three major ways. First, the specification was 
generally more comprehensive than existing models. Second, they improved the 
measurement of several important variables using new data and methodology. Third, they 
tested the usual assumption that all observations on high quality enlistments are supply 
constrained. 
The authors considered national advertising separately from local advertising, where 
the national advertising was measured in terms of the impression incurred made, while the 
local advertising was measured in terms of the actual expenses. Recruiter experience, as 
well as the number of production recruiters, was used to find the recruiter elasticity. 
Additionally, several incentive related variables were included, as were environmental 
conditions. They estimated log-linear enlistment models, since ordinary least squares are 
potentially subject to simultaneity bias. To avoid bias they adopted a limited-information 
approach, using instrumental variable estimation. 
Daula and Smith found that demand (in the form of the enlistment goals assigned to 
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recruiter) does affect the number of enlistments obtained. Enlistment models without the 
enlistment goals may not provide accurate forecasts, especially when these goals are 
changing. Therefore, the pooled sample model, without the enlistment goals or other service 
enlistments, was substantially less accurate than the complete specification. But, they used 
manufacturing wages as their measure of civilian opportunities. The use of these variables 
would be less of a problem if they were highly correlated with the wage opportunities 
available to potential recruits. Unfortunately, that would cause the parameter estimates in 
the mihtary labor supply models to be statistically inconsistent due to errors-in-variables. 
Polich, Dertouzos and Press [Ref.23] evaluated the effects of expanded cash bonuses 
authorized by Congress (the Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1981) to attract highly qualified 
young people into military service. Two new bonus programs were tested in the Army from 
July 1982 through June 1984. These data included mihtary data enlistment rates during the 
test period and one-year base period. Different levels of bonus programs were included in 
the model along with the number of recruiters and advertising expenses. Advertising was 
measured in terms of national as well as local expenditure. 
For labor market conditions, the unemployment rate and the civilian wage of 
production workers in manufacturing industries were included, along with recruiting goals 
for high and low quality recruits.   Recruiting elasticities were obtained based on a two-stage 
estimation procedure. They showed that bonuses can have a substantial effect on recruiting. 
Bonuses are a very flexible policy tool, by design.   Without  altering the fundamental 
structure or level of military compensation, bonuses can be quickly altered when shortfalls 
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appear in specific personnel categories.   Also, bonuses are a useful option for management 
of enlistment flows and for overcoming personnel shortages in critical skills. 
Dertouzos [Ref. 7] analyzed the effects of advertising on recruiting and quantitative 
estimates of the relative effectiveness of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and joint 
advertising programs. The cost effectiveness of military advertising was investigated, based 
on additional econometrics analysis of observed monthly enlistment outcomes, advertising 
pattern, missions, demographic conditions, and recruiter allocations for all four services 
conducted in 210 markets during FY84, the year of the Advertising Mix Test. Total 
service-specific enlistment rates (contracts per 17-21 year old) will be a log-linear function 
of that services' recruiters, other services' advertising, and joint advertising. Other 
recruiting components included were; the number of recruiter quotas per capita, per capita 
income and unemployment rates. National military data advertising dollars were expressed 
as a weighted sum of current and past expenditures, under the assumption that the effects 
diminish by 40 percent monthly. 
Elasticities were estimated based on seemingly unrelated regressions. He found that 
joint advertising program was estimated to have a positive effect for all four services, and 
the estimates of own-service effects were not significant for the Navy or Marine Corps. 
Dertouzos and Polich [Ref. 8] developed a model to analyze the Army advertising 
effects on high quality enlistment, utilizing unique information describing monthly Army 
advertising expenditures and advertising patterns for a three year period from July 1981 to 
June 1984 at the level of the military entrance processing station (MEPS).   Most recruiting 
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advertising is done through national or centralized media purchases (i.e., network television, 
network radio, national magazine, and direct mail), as well as local advertising purchases 
(daily, weekly and high school newspapers, local radio advertisings, magazine advertisings). 
High quality enlistment elasticities, with respect to several recruiting components and 
environmental variables, were obtained using a nonlinear three-stage least squares method. 
This provided consistent estimates for all the underlying structural parameters representing 
recruiter behavior, general supply relationships, and advertising effects. The print media 
appear to be the most cost effective advertising outlet. In particular, magazine advertisements 
are superior to other forms of national advertising in terms of the short-run elasticities. 
Results strongly support the conclusion that advertising expenditures substantially 
affect short-run enlistment behavior, and expansion of the Army advertising program during 
a given month can induce increases in high quality contracts for as long as six months. 
Statistical results indicate that national magazine and local newspaper purchases are the most 
effective in promoting enlistments. National radio and network TV also have considerable 
effects. 
Goldberg [Ref. 11] estimated the effects of the Army's educational benefits program 
on the supply of Army GSMA (high school Graduate or Senior Male, test score category 
I-IIIA) enlistments using regression analysis with monthly battalion-level data for the period 
FY81-89 (5184 observations). He did try to take into account the changes in MOS coverage. 
Estimates were obtained using the fixed effects technique, focusing on educational 
benefit variables and taking into account both the level of benefits and the coverage of the 
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programs. He found that ACF benefits reduce the term-of-service selected and that it is 
increased by bonuses. ACF benefits and bonuses affect the term-of-service (TOS) choice 
made by enlistees. These effects should be taken into account by policy makers when they 
assess the cost and benefits of the programs. 
Warner [Ref.33] dealt with the inter-service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 
Corps) advertising competition issue on quarterly data for the 41 Navy Recruiting Districts 
(NRD) during the period 1981-1987 (1148 observations). Two log-linear regression models 
(one with trend and the other without time trend) were fitted to each service using a fixed 
effect regression estimator. Each recruiting related variable was measured as the deviation 
in a given quarter from the average value of the variable in the given NRD over the 28 
quarter sample period. 
The findings had confirmed the importance of educational benefits and high quality 
enlistments were responsive to civilian unemployment rate, relative military pay, and 
recruiting variations (recruiters, advertising, and educational benefits). Regarding the 
estimated effects of advertising, the Army is the only service for which a consistently 
significant positive effect of advertising is maintained. Regarding inter-service relationships, 
all three services (except Marine) were estimated to benefit from increases in the recruiter 
strengths of the other services. Army enlistments apparently were independent of the other 
services advertising expenditures. Larger advertising expenditures by the other services, 
primarily by the Army, were estimated to reduce both Navy and Air Force enlistments. 
However, this information might be less reliable than the cross-service recruiter 
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effects, because of the crudity and potential endogeniety of the advertising data. Recruiters 
and advertising have substantially lower marginal cost, that is, they remain the most cost- 
effective means of varying high quality enlistments. Both means of expanding enlistments 
were considerably cheaper than general pay increases and educational programs. 
Consequently, the services should rely on general pay increases only to solve recruiting 
shortfalls such as the situation that prevailed during the early 1980s. 
Kearl, Home and Gilroy [Ref. 15] used the generalized least squares method to 
estimate the high- quality enlistment supply model to correct heteroscedasticity. They 
used quarterly data for the five major Army brigades of the country, from the first quarter 
of 1981 through the first quarter of 1990. The dependent variable was the number of high 
quality male enlistment contracts per 10,000 male youths. The explanatory variables in the 
model included the relative pay, the number of production recruiters per 10,000 male 
youths, the total advertising budget, the real discounted cost of ACF benefits, a 
dichotomous variable representing the introduction of the Montgomery GI Bill (effective 
July 1985), and the unemployment rate of males who are older than 16 years. 
A summary of their study results is as follows. Youth labor market conditions, 
proxied by the total male unemployment rate, have an important effect. Relative pay also 
has a sizable enlistment effect. Recruiters and advertising variables also have major impacts 
on enlistment supply.   However, the enlistment effect of the ACF is relatively small. 
Alternative specifications of the model include two other variables: enlistment 
propensity and recruiting goals.   Propensity would be particularly important for a regional 
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model, since regions exhibit sizable differences in taste (The strongest propensities are in 
the Southeast and Southwest). But propensity is highly correlated with other exogenous 
variables. Including recruiting goals in the regression equation also affected the parameter 
estimates. The increasing recruiting goals could meet accession requirements without cost. 
Therefore, including both recruiting goals and propensity caused the estimated effects 
of all other variables to fall. 
Goldberg [Ref. 12] used the 41 NRDs annual data for FY81-89 and Army 
recruiting battalion monthly data set (FY1981-89) to fit four services' high, as well as low, 
quality contract production. Elasticities were based on estimates of time-series cross-section 
(TSCS) and time-series (TS) regression models. Separate enlistment models were estimated 
for non-prior service male high school diploma graduates in GSMA and GSMB. A log- 
linear model was used in the estimation. Each model included a basic set of economic 
factors (relative military pay, unemployment rate) and service specific variables (recruiters, 
goals, policies). The regression coefficients were partial elasticities, i.e., the percentage that 
enlistments change when a supply factor increases by one percent and all other factors are 
held fixed. For each service, both a combined annual time-series and cross-section model 
and a monthly time-series model were estimated based on the fixed effects procedure. 
Goldberg found that substantial enlistment supply is effected for relative military 
pay, unemployment rate, recruiters and GI Bill benefits for all services. This study yielded 
strong evidence that ACF benefits affect GSMA enlistments. Bonuses for 3-year enlistment 
increased GSMA by about 5% in July 1984 when the program was introduced nationally. 
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The TS models should be used for short-run forecasting.   It appeared that the best estimates 
of elasticities can be obtained with monthly rather than the annual district level models. 
Lovell and Morey [Ref. 17] employed a translog cost function to efficiently allocate 
incentive expenditure, so that various MOS quotas could be satisfied. They estimated the 
translog incentive cost function for 21 MOS. The seemingly unrelated regression technique 
was used to estimate the model parameters based on FY81-86 data from the U. S. army 
Recruiting Command, which allocated over $1 billion for special incentives to selected 
recruits. The dependent variable was the number of high quality male enlistment contracts 
and the explanatory variables in the model included incentive unit costs (the size of the 
eligible population, relative pay, advertising expenditure), enlistment outside the MOS and 
environmental variables. The incentives consist of enlistment bonuses (EBs) up to $8k and 
the ACF with differing educational benefits for 2, 3 or 4 year terms. The total incentive 
cost, in FY86 dollars, was approximately $1.17 billion. 
Lovell and Morey developed and illustrated an econometrics approach for 
estimating the cost-efficient allocation of consumer incentives. They found that the key 
Infantry MOS (with more than 25% of all dollars) was quite well managed. The ACF 
incentive should have received 5.5% more of the budget than it had in fact received. 
However, for some other MOS's the total predicted allocative inefficiency was relatively 
high. This might be due to the fact that the other skills have much higher market values 
in the civilian sector than does Infantry, suggesting that the Army need not offer such 
generous enlistment incentives for those other MOS's.   Also, ACF tends to attract short-term 
24 
enlistments. Within both the ACF and the EB systems different benefits are available with 
different terms of service, suggesting that the disaggregation of each monetary incentive 
option may be useful. 
Berner and Daula [Ref.2] proposed a high quality enlistment model in which the 
goal for the quality contract is endogenized. Using Current Population Survey data (CPS), 
they developed a more accurate estimate of the alternative wage faced by young men. In 
constructing this alternative wage series, they were concerned not only with measurement 
error, but also with the possibility of simultaneity between the wage variable and military 
labor supply. 
They employed statistical specifications, so called, three regime switching 
simultaneous-equations in order to allow varying behavior across recruiting environments 
that reflect the asymmetric incentives faced by recruiters. Three regimes are followed in 
terms of the battalion's contract achievement conditions: 
1) far below the mission in a given month; 
2) close to mission achievement; 
3) already virtually assured of meeting its mission as it enters the final days of a 
month. 
They used a log-linear model.   Elasticities were obtained using 55 monthly Army 
recruiting battalion level data sets as well as monthly information on the economic 
environment and demographics during the period from  October 1980 to January 1990. 
They had presented strong evidence that the institutional environment, in which Army 
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recruiting takes place, necessitates a switching equation specification of the aggregate 
labor-supply process. In addition, they showed that the procedures for allocating recruiting 
goals for high quality soldiers result in these goals being endogenous to the supply process. 
They also found that labor supply to the Army was positively related to relative pay and 
unemployment rate, and that marginal recruits appear to be very sensitive to monetary 
incentives such as EBs. They found that relative pay is overemphasized during the goal- 
setting process and that unemployment rate is underemphasized. 
26 
B. OBSERVATION 
As reviewed, most recruiting studies share the same purpose: to estimate high 
quality contract elasticities with respect to several recruiting related components. However, 
the estimated elasticities vary considerably over the different studies, possibly due to 
several different factors associated with each study. In general, the recruiter elasticity was 
hypothesized as the highest among the recruiting resource elasticities. In most studies, the 
estimate was based on the number of production recruiters, while one study (Daula and 
Smith [Ref.6]) used the recruiter experience as an additional variable to represent the 
recruiter effort. 
The advertising elasticity was measured in terms of either the total expenditure or 
the impressions generated. The elasticity can be measured in terms of the national and local 
advertising which can be further decomposed into media type (TV, radio, and print). In 
view of the limited information available for the impressions data and relatively small 
amount of local advertising, most studies employ total advertising expenditure data to 
estimate the elasticity. However, in some studies (Dertouzos [Ref.7]; Dertouzos and 
Polich [Ref. 8]) in which the main objective is to analyze the effect of advertising, elasticities 
are obtained with respect to each media type. 
As incentives, the Army has offered the ACF with various options since the initial 
test program year in 1981. During FY1981, all services participated in a program that 
systematically varied the kind of education benefits program that could be offered in 
different recruiting districts.   Starting in FY82, there was a similar test conducted by the 
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Army only. Prior to FY86, Army enlistees ineligible for ACF benefits and enlistees into 
the other services continued to be eligible for basic Veteran's Educational Assistance 
Program (VEAP) benefits. A NGIB was then passed by Congress in 1985 which provides 
such enlistees with better educational benefits than those available in the VEAP. In order 
to estimate incentive elasticities, some studies use the total expenditure related to incentives 
while the others used dummy variables to represent different levels of incentives utilizing 
the experimental data (Daula and Smith [Ref.6]). 
Enlistment goal has been considered one of the most influential predictors for high 
quality contracts.   However, some studies did not include the goal variable in the model. 
Recently, Berner and Daula [Ref.2] treated it as an endogenous variable. 
Unemployment rate was treated as relatively homogeneous in many recruiting 
analyses. In estimating the relative military pay elasticity, the entry level military pay (El- 
E2) was used in comparison to the manufacturing sector civilian pay. In some studies 
(Polich, Dertouzos and Press [Ref.23]; Dertouzos [Ref.7]; Dertouzos and Polich [Ref.8]), 
the relative pay was replaced with the civilian wage. 
The prime target market population is one of the important labor market variables. 
In place of the prime target market population, some authors (Daula and Smith [Ref.6]) 
used "qualified military available" defined as the prime target market population consisting 
of those who are mentally and physically healthy and score in the top 50th percentile of 
AFQT, with a high school diploma. Inter-service competition related components such as 
other services advertising and goals were often deleted in the recruiting models used. 
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In sum, consistently analyzed recruiting-related components are advertising, the 
number of recruiters and the unemployment rate.   Although these variables were treated 
relatively homogeneously compared to the other   variables    such as  incentives   and pay, 
estimated elasticities of high quality enlistments with respect to these components vary 
over different studies conducted. 




IV. META ANALYSIS 
Meta analysis is a quantitative method that is used to summarize results from a 
series of related studies. The meta analysis process of cleaning up and making sense of 
research literature not only reveals the cumulative knowledge that is there, but also provides 
clearer directions about what the remaining research needs are. Meta analysis has been 
applied to the integration of literature in all areas of research such as the behavioral and 
social sciences, psychology, education, biology, medical science, and physical science 
since Gene V. Gass published the first journal article on meta analysis in 1976 [Ref. 14]. In 
this thesis, meta analysis is used as a major tool to integrate the military high quality 
recruiting literature. 
An important question in meta analysis is the consistency of study results. If each 
implementation of a new experimental treatment produces the same effect, it is sensible to 
summarize the entire stream of studies by a single common-effect size estimate. However, 
if the study results are inconsistent, the meta-analyst's task becomes more complicated. 
The hierarchical model provides a useful framework for addressing the problem of 
components of variation in meta analysis [Ref.3]. This hierarchical model enables the 
meta-analyst (a) to estimate the average effect size, such as the elasticity across a set of 
studies; (b) to estimate the variance of the effect-size parameters (as distinguished from the 
variance of the estimates); (c) to pose and test a series of linear models to explain variation 
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in the effect-size parameters; (d) to estimate the residual variance of the effect-size 
parameters for each model; and (e) to use information from all studies to derive empirical 
Bayes estimates of each study's effect. 
General procedures for the hierarchical linear model for meta analysis involve the 
following areas: 
1) Effect-Size Estimate 
2) Level-1 (Within-study) Model 
3) Level-2 (Between-studies) Model 
4) Combined Model 
5) Estimation. 
A.   GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL 
1. Effect-size estimate 
A meta-analyst rarely has access to raw data from each study.   Instead, subject data 
from each study are summarized by a statistic.    This statistic characterizes the magnitude 
of an effect, or the strength of association between variables. This statistic, ß, is denoted 
as the "effect-size estimate" for study /'. p. could be a mean difference, correlation 
coefficient or elasticity, and so on. The statistic, ß., may be viewed as an estimator for the 
corresponding population parameter, ß;. 
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2.   Level -1 (within-study) model 
The level - 1 model is 
ß.    =ß,+ £. for studies/= 1, ....,#, (1) 
where £ is the sampling error associated with p.. We assume £'s are independently 
and normally distributed with zero mean and variancev(p.), where v(p.) is the sampling 
variance of   p. and £   is independent of the unknown ß,. 
3. Level - 2 (between-studies) model 
The true unknown - effect size, ß,, depends on study characteristics and a random 
error: 
ß/     =Y0+   Yflil    +7^2 +    -..+   Yrrtim  +  Ö, (2) 
m 
M 
where   x,7, . . . , xim   are study characteristics; 
j^0, . . ., Ym are regression coefficients; and 
Si are independently and normally distributed with zero mean and common 
variance o2. 
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4. Combined model 
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) yields 
ß, = r0 + E r*** + <*,- + 6 , (3) fci 
where    ß.  is normally distributed, that is,    $t~N(y0+ £ y,pcih c^+vCß,.) ). 
Note that model (3) is called a random effects model.   When Si is omitted from model 
(3), this model becomes a fixed effects model. 
5. Estimation 
Because each   ß. will be known from each study result /', there is only one variance 
component to be estimated, o2. Given a maximum likelihood estimate of a2, the Level-2 
coefficients (the ^s) are estimated by means of weighted least squares where the weights are 
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B.   RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL 
1. Heteroscedastic Maximum Likelihood (HML) estimation 
A fixed effects meta analysis has often been used in marketing analysis to find 
significant factors associated with varying study results (Assmus, Farley, and Lehmann 
[Ref. 1]; Szymanski, David and Paul Busch [Ref.30]; Rust, Lehmann, and Farley [Ref.26]). 
In a fixed effects model, estimated study results (e.g., elasticities), are combined and 
used as a dependent variable that is related to some independent variables that may cause 
the variation in different study results. The coefficients associated with each independent 
variable have been typically estimated using an ordinary least square (OLS) method. 
However, the accuracy of estimated study results often varies, which violates the 
homogeneous assumption of the OLS method. Recently, Chandrashenkran and Walker 
[Ref.4] employ a heteroscedastic maximum likelihood estimation (HMLE), which is a 
maximum-likelihood-based estimation procedure that explicitly corrects for 
heteroscedasticity. The HMLE enhances the utility of meta analysis as an integrative tool 
for marketing research by providing a method to overcome the problem of 
heteroscedasticity, an important threat to the validity of meta-analytic findings. 
Heteroscedasticity impairs OLS estimates by reducing the efficiency and, consequently, 
the power of OLS to detect variables that may moderate the theoretical relationship of 
interest. Heteroscedasticity has potentially serious implications for theoretical inferences 
drawn from the results of a meta analysis that uses OLS as the analytic framework.   In a 
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heteroscedastic environment, the OLS estimator will be unbiased and consistent, but it 
will also be inefficient and its variance estimator will be biased and inconsistent. Further, 
the inefficiency and variance bias will increase as heteroscedasticity becomes more severe. 
HMLE will produce unbiased, consistent, and the most efficient estimators among the class 
of unbiased estimators. Besides explicitly correct for heteroscedasticity, HMLE will 
generally be more efficient and powerful than OLS [Ref.4]. However, in general, the 
results obtained from the fixed effects model are only applied to those studies included in 
the analysis. 
2. Random effects meta analysis model 
In a random effects model [Ref.27], the elasticity involved in each study is 
considered as an outcome of a random sample from a population. The result of the random 
effects model can then be applied to any study that falls in the same population. In this 
thesis, various recruiting studies are viewed as imperfect replications of one overall 
unplanned experiment. Each elasticity is assumed to be random, however, part of the 
variation can be explained by some candidate factors. The random effects linear model for 
the elasticity is then fitted against some factors and is used to identify sources of systematic 
variation. Structural models employed in many econometric analyses (/ = 1, . . ., N) may 
not be exactly identical, however, the reduced form of each study / would be close to the 
following: 
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luff, =ß'0+ ß',liL4,+ K^R,j +ß'>^+ ... + e,, (4) 
where j is the unit of case study i; 
Hy  is the 7th observation of the high quality contract in study i; 
Ay   is the 7th observation of the advertising expenditure in study i; 
Ry   is theyth observation of the number of production recruiters in study /'; 
Uy   is they'th observation of the unemployment rate in study i; 
ß'0   is the intercept coefficient of study i; 
ß'A.   is the high quality elasticity with respect to component k obtained from study i, k = A, 
R, U; 
ey  is the random error with E(eö ) = 0 and V(e;/ )=T,2. 
It  is assumed that   ß* is random and most variation can be explained by some 
factors xik related to each study /'.   In other words, 
ß*=**ft + ö* (5) 
fork = A, R, U, where $k is an TV x 7 vector of ß'^and^ is an Nxm matrix consisting 
of factors % related to the variation of ß Vs. %isan m x 7 vector of coefficients and 6k 
is an TV x 7 vector of independent random errors that takes into account the remaining 
variation of ßVs. We assume ö*. ~7V(0, a2rfv). Since ß^ is unobservable, the estimated 
37 
elasticity, ß^, obtained from each study i, can replace ß'k. As a result, estimation error £, 
which is independent of 6k is added to equation (5): 
ß*   = xtyk + 6k + 5* (6) 
It is further assumed that ^'s are independent of each other. In most cases, estimated 
elasticity (Pi) and standard error of  P* (se( Ky^nfy) are  obtained based on a large 
sample (a combined cross section and time series data set). Therefore, 6k+ E,k would follow 
JV(0, vk) where the N* N diagonal matrix vk has diagonal values o\ + u( ß^)'s. That is, 
K ~N(xkYb vk)- Since P and u( j^) are available from each recruiting study /', when a2 is 
known, yk can be obtained using a weighted least square estimator(WLS), yk ^(xkvk'xk)'1 
{xk\' Pt). However, quite often a2 is unknown and can be estimated using the maximum 
likelihood (ML) method which maximizes the following log likelihood function Lk: 
Lk- -0.5£ ln(2*  (o£ ♦ 6(pJ))) - 0.5£ -^ ^- (7) 
" "   (°l ♦ 6(ßS) 
The resulting WLS estimator for    YI can be expressed as (xk* v^X)"1 (xkvk ßfc), 
where v^   consists of diagonal elements, ö\ + U(PK). The estimated variance of    yk   is 
(V^k)"1- When the sample size, TV, is large, asymptotic inferences regarding yk can be 
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made based on   ywk   ~N(yk, (xkvklxk)~l). 
To test H0 : yk - 0 for all m elements, an F statistic with m and N - m degrees of 
freedom for numerator and denominator, respectively, can be used when sample size N 
is large. When a single element of yk is subjected to test, a t statistic can be used with 
N- m degrees of freedom. 
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V.DATA   ANALYSIS 
A. ACQUISITION OF DATA 
Sixteen study results are selected from the previous econometric analyses described 
in the earlier section: 1 from (Dertouzos and Polich [Ref.7]); 8 from (Warner [Ref.33]); 3 
from (Kearl, Home and Gilroy [Ref. 15]); and 4 from (Goldberg [Ref. 12]). Description of 
the labeling of each study is given in Table 4. The selection criteria for these sixteen study 
results are as follows: (1) the target dependent variable is the high quality enlistment; (2) 
the advertising elasticity is measured in terms of the expenditure; (3) the recruiter 
elasticity is estimated based on the number of production recruiters. 
Table 4. DESCRIPTION OF EACH STUDY USED IN META ANALYSIS 
1 WNT Warner (90) Navy model with time trend variable 
2 WN Warner (90) Navy model without time trend variable 
3 WFT Warner (90) Air Force model with time trend variable 
4 WF Warner (90) Air Force model without time trend variable 
5 WMT Warner (90) Marine Corps model with time trend variable 
6 WM Warner (90) Marine Corps model without time trend variable 
7 KHG Kearl, Home and Gilroy (90) Army model without goal and propensity variables 
8 KHGP Kearl, Home and Gilroy (90) Army model with propensity variable 
9 KHGGP Kearl, Home and Gilroy (90) Army model with goal and propensity variables 
10 DP Dertouzos and Polich (89) Army model (National advertising elasticity is used.) 
11 GOLD ID Goldberg (91) Army cross section and TS model estimated based on DMDC data 
12 GOLD2D Goldberg (91) Army time series model estimated based on DMDC data set 
13 GOLD1A Goldberg (91) Army cross section and TS model estimated based on  USAREC data 
14 GOLD2A Goldberg (91) Army TS model estimated based on USAREC data set 
15 WAT Warner (90) Army model with time trend variable 
16 WA Warner (90) Army model without time trend variable 
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Table 5 displays the estimated high quality contract elasticities with respect to 
advertising expenditure, recruiter effort, and unemployment rate as well as their standard 
errors. 
Table 5. FACTORS AND ELASTICITIES 
i Study Army Comp Goal ßV  se( P'J ßV  se(   ß's) ß'„/   se(P'„) 
1 WNT 0 0.015 / 0.008 0.412/0.047 0.477 / 0.024 
2 WN 0 
-0.001/0.0070 0.459 / 0.047 0.441/0.022 
-> WFT 0 
-0.034/0.0150 -0.045 / 0.050 0.203 / 0.028 
4 WF 0 
-0.038/0.0150 -0.168/0.048 0.139/0.027 
5 WMT 0 
-0.017/0.050 0.487 / 0.076 0.483 / 0.030 
6 WM 0 0.001/0.0200 0.957 / 0.066 0.402/0.031 
7 KHG 0 0 0.720/0.1080 1.150/0.095 0.650/0.071 
8 KHGP 0 0 0.580/0.1060 0.680/0.138 0.650 / 0.069 
9 KHGGP 0 1 0.430/0.1070 0.480/0.133 0.570 / 0.064 
10 DP 0 0.0231/0.0044 0.542/ 0.064 0.512/0.107 
11 GOLD ID 0 0.340 / 0.0436 0.160/0.080 0.430 / 0.040 
12 GOLD2D 0 0.010/0.0076 0.290/0.216 0.720 / 0.075 
13 GOLD 1A 0 0.050/0.0058 0.150/0.031 0.590/0.018 
14 GOLD2A 0 0.020/0.0119 0.350/0.330 0.760/0.126 
15 WAT 1 0.103/0.0400 0.371/0.074 0.554 / 0.026 
16 WA 1 0.198/0.0410 0.482 / 0.076 0.451/0.025 
42 
B. FACTORS AND CASES IN RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL 
Recruiting study results used in the random effects model have some common 
features as well as differences. The common features are, first, the relatively homogeneous 
measurement of advertising, recruiter effort, and unemployment rate; secondly the time 
period (1989-1991) based on which the high quality contract elasticity of each component 
is estimated; thirdly, the availability of standard error of the estimated elasticity. The 
results of studies differ in terms of the military service (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine 
Corps), inclusion of other service's competition, and inclusion of recruiting goal. In view 
of these different features, the three factors which are reported in Table 6 in order to 
analyze the systematic variation in the elasticities are considered. 
Table 6. FACTORS IN THE RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL 
Factor Service Competition Goal 
Level 1 Army (1) Included (1) Included (1) 
Level 2 Other Service (0) Not Included (0) Not Included (0) 
When the study results in terms of the three factors with the two levels are 
summarized, there are eight possible combinations. However, only four out of the eight 
combinations have been employed in the studies analyzed. The simple means of the 
estimated elasticities for each combination are given in Table 7. The simple mean, 
however, does not reflect the differing accuracies associated with the estimates. 
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Table 7. MEAN ELASTICITIES OF RECRUITING COMPONENTS 
Case Service Comp Goal Freq Mean(ß^) Mean(ßÄ) Mean^) 
1 0 0 0 na na na na 
2 0 0 1 na na na na 
3 0 1 0 na na na na 
4 1 1 0 na na na na 
5 0 1 1 6 -0.012 0.350 0.358 
6 1 0 0 2 0.650 0.915 0.650 
7 1 0 1 6 0.146 0.329 0.597 
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In Figures 6-8 , estimated elasticities are plotted with associated standard errors for 
advertising, recruiter, and unemployment rate, respectively. Note that some of the outliers 
(e.g., negative elasticities or large positive elasticities) are accompanied by relatively large 
standard errors. Besides these apparent outliers, some variation is still observed. 
C. ESTIMATED MODELS 
The random effects linear model for the elasticity is then fitted against the three 
factors and is used to identify significant sources of systematic variation. By applying 
equation (7) to the data set in Table 5, the ML estimators a\ 's for advertising, recruiter, 
and unemployment rate models are obtained as 0.00540196, 0.06807596, 0.010258, 
respectively. For this estimation, an optimization package GAMS program is used in 
Appendix A. This information is then used to find the WLS estimators of y. It is interesting 
to compare WLS estimator, ?* = (xk' ffx^fäv? ßk), to the OLS estimator, fk =(xMA 
(V ßt), and the HML estimator, yf = 0V Hgcky\x^Hk ßfc),  where Hk=[ v ( ß ,')]"'•  The 
results of the WLS estimator ywk,se(^)'s and p-value are given in Table 8. The results of 
the OLS estimator are displayed in Table 9, while the corresponding information for the 
HML estimator is given in Table 10, respectively for three elasticity models. A copy of the 
SAS program used to obtain WLS estimator is in Appendix B. 
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Table 8. WLS ESTIMATE   ywk   AND SE ( ?*) 
AD Expenditure REC Effort UNEM Rate 
Factor Y^         *«( Y^ ) 
P-Value 
Y*         **Y* ) 
P-Value 
Yu        se(yu) 
P-Value 
Intercept 0.487    (0.147) 
0.0062 
0.850    (0.332) 
0.0251 
0.505    (0.137) 
0.0031 
Service 0.162   (0.086) 
0.0846 
0.080    (0.245) 
0.7501 
0.145    (0.096) 
0.1574 
Competition 0.052   (0.088) 
0.5634 
0.103    (0.252) 
0.6904 
-0.078   (0.100) 
0.4519 
Goal -0.551   (0.126) 
0.0009 
-0.606   (0.262) 
0.0391 
-0.070   (0.113) 
0.5494 
Table 9. OLS ESTIMATE   Y*  AND SE(Y*) 
AD Expenditure REC Effort UNEM Rate 
Factor 
P-Value 
Y*         ** Y* ) 
P-Value 
Yy        *e(Yj/) 
P-Value 
Intercept 0.487    (0.137) 
0.004 
0.839    (0.323) 
0.0234 
0.505    (0.137) 
0.0031 
Service 0.163   (0.104) 
0.1423 
0.076    (0.244) 
0.7606 
0.145    (0.104) 
0.1873 
Competition 0.005   (0.104) 
0.9625 
0.098    (0.244) 
0.6959 
-0.095   (0.104) 
0.3800 
Goal -0.504   (0.104) 
0.0004 
-0.586   (0.244) 
0.0335 
-0.053   (0.104) 
0.6185 
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~H Table 10. HML ESTIMATE   yk   AND SE ( y") 
AD Expenditure REC Effort UNEM Rate 
Factor YA      se(yA) 
P-Value 
Y*        se(yR ) 
P-Value 
Yi;   se(yv) 
P-Value 
Intercept 0.490    (0.245) 
0.0683 
0.857    (0.491) 
0.1066 
0.515    (0.210) 
0.0301 
Service 0.158   (0.087) 
0.0945 
0.141    (0.290) 
0.6347 
0.135    (0.082) 
0.1251 
Competition 0.119   (0.087) 
0.1963 
0.196    (0.298) 
0.5236 
-0.071   (0.092) 
0.4536 
Goal -0.619   (0.229) 
0.0193 
-0.770   (0.417) 
0.0898 
-0.078   (0.202) 
0.7053 
In terms of p-values from Tables 8-10, in general, WLS has the lower p-values of 
elasticities than those of elasticiticies in OLS and HML methods. The significant factors at 
level of 10% obtained based on the three different estimation methods are summarized in 
Table 11. Table 11 indicates that the recruiter effort and unemployment rate models share 
the same significant factors regardless of different estimation methods, while the OLS 
method provides slightly different results in the advertising expenditure model. 
Since, the number of available studies in each category is not equal, Yk does not 
necessarily represent the main effect on elasticity k as in a balanced design. However, 
from Table 8, one can conclude that Army advertising elasticity is higher than that of the 
other military services, while the model that contains the goal variable  provides lower 
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advertising elasticity than its counterpart on average at significance level a=10%. For 
recruiter elasticity, there is a negative effect of goal factor. In other words, the models 
including the recruiting goal variable tend to result in smaller recruiter elasticity. None of 
the three factors considered has a significant effect on the unemployment rate elasticity, a 
weighted mean elasticity is obtained as 0.4797, where the weight is proportional to the 
inverse of the variance associated with each elasticity,   av + o(Py). 








AD Expenditure Goal, Service Goal Goal, Service 
REC Effort Goal Goal Goal 
UNEM Rate None None None 
D. DISCUSSION 
In Figures 9-11, the WLS model based 95% confidence intervals for high quality 
elasticities with respect to advertising, recruiter, and unemployment rate are displayed, 
respectively. Note that cases 1 to 4 are extrapolated results. Case 8 which considers both 
competition and goal factors for the Army model is of particular interest. In this case, with 
respect to advertising and recruiter, the values of the 95% confidence intervals centered 
at the mean for the Army high quality enlistments elasticities are (-0.01732, 0.15023, 
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Figure 11. 95% Confidence Interval for Unemployment Rate Elasticity 
These intervals can be interpreted as follows. As advertising expenditure increases by 
1%, it is expected that high quality enlistments would increase by 0.15% on average and 
by a maximum of 0.32% with 95% confidence. In other words, at least 3.15% increase in 
advertising expenditure is needed to increase high quality enlistments by 1%. Likewise, 
as the number of recruiters increases by 1%, it is estimated that high quality enlistments 
would increase by 0.43% on average and by a maximum of 0.89% with 95% confidence. 
That is, minimum 1.12% expansion in the number of recruiters can be expected to increase 
high quality enlistments by 1%. In terms of cost, based on the historical data for the Army 
recruiting from FY81 to FY89 as given in Table 12, at least an additional 2.85 million 
dollars (FY95 constant) should be spent for the Army advertising to increase the high 
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quality enlistments by 1% (about 492 personnel). Using the same logic, minimum of 1.87 
million dollars (FY95 constant) are needed in the recruiter expenditure to recruit the same 
amount of increase in high quality enlistments. Generally speaking, the military pay for 
the recruiters appears to be more cost-effective in producing high quality recruits than 
advertising expenditure, when the cumulative long-run effects for advertising were ignored. 
For the other services (except the Army), the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 
the advertising and recruiters provide expected elasticities based on the random effects 
models that contain both competition and goal factors as (-0.09821, -0.01223, 0.07374) and 
(0.08310, 0.34657, 0.61005) as shown in case 5 of Figures 9-10. These confidence 
intervals can be explained as follows. When advertising expenditure increases by 1%, it is 
expected that high quality contracts would increase by a maximum of 0.07% with 95% 
confidence. In other words, a 13.56% increase in advertising expenditure expands high 
quality enlistments by at most 1%. Similarly, a 1.64% increase in the number of recruiters 
could be expected to increase high quality enlistments by at most 1%. However, note that 
the WLS model based on 95% confidence intervals for the mean recruiter elasticity (-0.0377, 
0.8904) is relatively wide, which indicates that some additional factors are needed in the 
random effects model for recruiter elasticity to explain the remaining variation and to 
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A. SUMMARY OF RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS 
In this thesis, the econometric analyses of high quality recruiting based on military 
recruiting data sets from FY81 to FY89 were reviewed. Three factors (Service, Competition, 
Goal) were employed in an effort to observe variation in high quality enlistments elasticities 
with respect to advertising, recruiter, and unemployment rate. A random effects linear 
model is fitted for each recruiting component based on the actual study results. Army 
advertising turns out to be more effective than that of the other military services. 
Elimination of the recruiting goal from the military recruiting analysis appears to bring 
significantly high quality elasticities with respect to advertising and recruiter effort. None 
of the factors turns out to be significantly dependent on the variation in unemployment rate 
elasticity. 
For the Army, when goal and other services competition components are included in 
the analysis, random effects models provide the estimated high quality elasticity with respect 
to advertising expenditure, recruiter effort, and unemployment rate as 0.150, 0.426, and 
0.502 respectively . In sum, it appears that the Army advertising elasticity on the high 
quality contract is relatively low compared to the unemployment rate and the recruiter 
elasticities. In terms of cost, at least an additional 2.85 million dollars (FY95 constant) 
should be spent for the Army advertising in order to increase the high quality enlistments 
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by 1% (about 492 personnel). Using the same method, an additional minimum of 1.87 
million dollars (FY95 constant) are needed in the recruiter expenditure to recruit the same 
amount of increase in high quality enlistments. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The three factors and the case studies used in this thesis may not be exhaustive. 
One of the additional factors to be further considered in the meta analysis for the military 
recruiting models is different estimation methods, provided   that there are sufficient 
replicated studies in which the same estimation method is used. 
In the analysis of random effects meta analysis models, it was assumed that the 
results of each published study are independent of each other. However, it is possible that 
some study results might be related due to the estimation of slightly different models on the 
same data set. Although neglecting the potential dependence in the random effects meta 
analysis models does not appear to have a significant impact on the inference procedure, 
a sensitivity analysis based on Monte Carlo simulation is recommended for further study. 
In analyzing a set of three elasticities (advertising, recruiter, and unemployment rate), 
a multivariate analysis could be applied. However, in general, the covariance matrices for 
estimated elasticities for several recruiting components are not reported in the literature and 
subsequent analysis is infeasible. All studies reviewed in this thesis assume a constant 
elasticity,   which does not necessarily reflect the dynamic feature of military recruiting. 
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It is recommended that authors report the covariance matrix of the estimated elasticities 
and a time varying coefficient method (Parsons 1975; Tegene 1992; Riddington 1993) be 




APPENDIX A. GAMS PROGRAM 
$TITLE THESIS GAMS PROGRAM 
SSTITLE MAX VALUE USING MAXLKEHOOD FUN TO FIND GAMMA, VALUE,SIGS 
* GAMS AND DOLLAR CONTROL OPTIONS  
$OFFUPPER OFFSYMLIST OFFSYMXREF 
OPTIONS 
LIMCOL = 0 , LIMROW = 0   , SOLPRINT - OFF , DECIMALS = 8 
RESLIM = 100, ITERLIM = 10000, OPTCR    = 0.0 , SEED     =3141; 
*  
*TO FIND AD WITHOUT WEIGHT 
SETS 
I    /1*16/ 
J    /INTC,ARMY,COMP,GOAL/; 
TABLE X (U) 
INTC ARMY COMP GOAL 
1          ] 0 1 
2           ] 0 0 
3           ] 0 0 
4           ] 1 
5           1 1 
6           ] 0 1 
7           ] 0 1 
8           ] 0 1 
9           ] 0 1 
10          ] 0 1 
11          ] 0 1 
12          ] 0 1 
13          ] 0 1 
14 0 1 
15 0 1 
16 0 i; 
PARAMETER SEBETA(I) STANDARD ERROR OF AD I 
/l  0.107,2 0.106,3 0.108,4 0.04,5 0.041,6 0.008,7 0.007, 
8 0.015,9 0.015, 10 0.005, 11  0.02, 12 0.0044, 13 0.0436, 
14 0.0076, 15 0.0058, 16 0.0119/; 




BETA(I)     ESTIMATE BETA 
/l 0.43, 2 0.58,3  0.72,4 0.103,5 0.198,6 0.015,7 -0.001,8 -0.034,9 -0.038, 




















NORMAL.. VALUE=E=-0.5 * SUM(I,LOG((2*3.1459)*(SIGS+VARBETA(I)))) 
-0.5:|:SUM(I,SQR(BETA(I)-(BO*X(I,,INTC')+B1*X(I,,ARMY,)+B2*X(I,,COMP,) 
+B3*X(I,'GOAL,)))/(SIGS+VARBETA(I))); 
MODEL STAT /ALL/; 
SOLVE STAT USING NLP MAXIMIZING VALUE; 
DISPLAY SIGS.L,VALUE.L,B0.L,B 1 L,B2.L,B3 L; 
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APPENDIX B. SAS PROGRAM 
OPTIONS LS=75; 
DATA ONE: 
INPUT STUD $ COMP GOALID   ARMY AD REC GOAL UNEM SEAD SEREC 
SEGOAL   SEUNEM 1 
CARDS; 
KHGGP 0   1 1 0.43 0.48 0.33 0.57 0.107 0.133 0.068 0.064 
KHGP 0   0 1 0.58 0.68 0.65 0.106 0.138 0.069 
KHG 0   0 1 0.72 1.15 0.65 0.108 0.095 0.071 
WAT 1   1 1 0.103 0.371 0.215 0.554 0.04 0.074 0.023 0.026 
WA 1    1 1 0.198 0.482 0.299 0.451 0.041 0.076 0.022 0.025 
WNT 1   1 0 0.015 0.412 0.257 0.477 0.008 0.047 0.059 0.024 
WN 1   1 0 -0.001 0.459 0.316 0.441 0.007 0.047 0.058 0.022 
WFT 1   1 0 -0.034 -0.045 0.280 0.203 0.015 0.05 0.055 0.028 
WF 1   1 0 -0.038 -0.168 0.318 0.139 0.015 0.048 0.055 0.027 
WMT 1  1 0 -0.017 0.487 0.032 0.483 0.005 0.076 0.047 0.03 
WM 1  1 0 0.001 0.957 -0.195 0.402 0.02 0.066 0.046 0.031 
DP 0   1 1 0.0231 0.542 0.134 0.512 0.0044 0.064 0.055 0.107 
GOLD1D 0   1 1 0.34 0.16 0.49 0.43 0.0436 0.08 0.0328 0.04 
GOLD2D 0   1 1 0.01 0.29 0.21 0.72 0.0076 0.216 0.041 0.075 
GOLD1A 0   1 1 0.05 0.15 0.28 0.59 0.0058 0.031 0.01 0.018 
GOLD2A 0   1 1 0.02 0.35 0.13 0.76 0.0119 0.33 0.053 0.126 
CASE1 0   0 0 
CASE2 0   1 0 
CASE3 1   0 0 
CASE4 1   0 1 
DATA ONE; SET ONE; 
WAD=l/(SEAD**2+0.00540190);WREC=l/(SEREC**2+0.06807596); 
WGOALKl/SEGOAL)**2; WUNEM=1/(SEUNEM**2+0.01025800); 
A='&'; E= '\Y ; 
PROC SORT; BY ARMY COMP GOALID ; 
PROC PRINT; 
PROC SUMMARY DATA=ONE; 
VAR AD REC UNEM GOAL; CLASS ARMY COMP GOALID ; 
OUTPUT OUT-OUT MEAN=    ; PROC PRINT; 
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PROC REG DATAONE; 
MODEL AD = ARMY COMP GOALID;WEIGHT WAD; 
OUTPUT 0UTOUT2 P=PAD   U95M=UAD L95M=LAD; 
PROC PRINT DATA=0UT2;VAR LAD PAD UAD; 
PROC REG DATA=ONE; 
MODEL UNEM= ARMY COMP GOALID;WEIGHT WUNEM; 
OUTPUT 0UT=0UT3 P-PUNEM U95M=UEM L95M=LEM; 
PROC PRINT DATA=OUT3;VARLEMPUNEMUEM; 
PROC REG DATA=ONE; 
MODEL REC = ARMY COMP GOALID;WEIGHT WREC; 
OUTPUT 0UT=0UT4 P=PREC U95M=UR L95M=LR; 
PROC PRINT DATA-OUT4; VAR LR PREC UR; 
PROC REG DATA-ONE; 
MODEL GOAL = ARMY COMP;WEIGHT WGOAL; 
OUTPUT OUT=OUT5 P=PGOAL U95M=UG L95M=LG; 
PROC PRINT DATA=OUT5;VAR LG PGOAL UG; 
DATA ALL; SET OUT2; SET OUT3; SET OUT4;SET OUT5; 
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